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ORTHODOX “IMAGINED COMMUNITIES”
IN THE OTTOMAN BALKANS

James R. Payton, Jr. *
James R. Payton, Jr., is Emeritus Professor of History, Redeemer University College, in Ancaster, Ontario, Canada. He served as Executive Secretary (1998-2006) and as President (20062011) of CAREE (Christians Associated for Relationships with Eastern Europe). Several of his
articles were previously published in OPREE/REE.

As a young scholar being trained in Early Modern European history, I imbibed unstated
assumptions along with the canons of western historiography. My teaching and research career,
though, soon moved eastward, to focus on Byzantium, the Balkans, and the Eastern Christianity
which permeated both. With this transition, I became uneasily aware of how little attention
western scholarship has given to these fields, 1 or to the momentous developments which took
place in the eastern half of the European continent. 2 Some of these developments challenge and
undermine some hallowed scholarly perspectives; among them is the assessment commonly held
among western scholars about the emergence of a sense of nation and nationalism.

Nations and Nationalism
The idea of “nation” requires a mental exercise of some creativity. It takes little cerebral
*

Earlier versions of this paper were presented at a Philosophy Department colloquium held at Southern Connecticut
State University (March 2011) and at the European Conference on Social and Behavioral Sciences held in Istanbul (June 2013).

1

This pattern has marked education in the English-speaking world both in Britain and in North America. It led John
Julius Norwich to produce a three-volume history of Byzantium, which he condensed into a single book, A Short
History of Byzantium (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997); he intended his study to offer “some small amends” for
the glaring omission of Byzantium in western educational curricula (xli [cf. xxxix]).
2
I have addressed some of these in “Revisioning the Historiography of Eastern Europe,” Fides & Historia 31
(1999):77-89; see also my “Religion and the Historiography of Eastern Europe,” Religion in Eastern Europe 21/2
(2001):1-16; and “Bypassing the History of Eastern Europe: A Failure of Twentieth Century Christian Scholarship,”
Christian Scholar’s Review 29 (2000):713-730.
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agility to recognize members of one’s family and broaden that to include one’s circle of
acquaintances in a rather obvious societal group. But envisaging something as broad and wide as
a “nation” entails conceiving of larger relationships, encompassing people one might never see
or interact with.
“Imagined Communities”
In 1983, Benedict Anderson coined the term “imagined communities” as a way of
describing this perception. 3 His contribution on this score aptly summarized and sharpened the
way scholars in the fields of political science and history have analyzed the notion of “nation”
and its ideological spawn, “nationalism.” Western scholarly perspectives on this question have
focused on what transpired in Western Europe; unquestionably, the sense of nation and
nationalism into which it ensued has significantly influenced the development of Western Europe
and North America during the very period in which the West has exercised great influence
throughout the world—namely, the last 500 years. That viewpoint ended up being exported to
the rest of the world, so much of which had been swallowed up in Western European colonial
empires; ironically, it eventually contributed significantly to the dismantling of those empires.
The larger world has thus unquestionably been profoundly impacted by this sense of nation and
nationalism.
Developments in Western Europe
The common historiographical assessment of the concept of “nation” urges that during
the Middle Ages, the inhabitants of Western Europe had no particular sense of belonging to any
such collectivity. For the vast majority, who would never travel further than five kilometers from
3

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, rev. ed. (New
York: Verso, 1991 [original edition in 1983]); for a condensed presentation of Anderson's argument, see his “The
Nation and the Origins of National Consciousness,” 56-63 in Montserrat Guibernau and John Rex, eds., The Ethnic
Reader: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Migration, 2d. ed. (Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2010).
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their birthplace, family and village acquaintances included the totality of their world--any sense
of larger organizations, with the exception of the Church, was beyond their mental frontiers. That
exception was an undeniably significant one, though;: during the early medieval period, through
the thirteenth century, the only overarching organization in Western Europe was the Christian
Church. It commanded whatever loyalty the common person could muster to a larger entity than
those composed of faces he/she could regularly see. The promised prospect of salvation from
God and an utterly changed state for the blessed lay beyond their understanding but not their
hope or loyalty.
As the fourteenth century dawned, with famine intruding in the wake of two decades of
poor harvests, combined in short order with the horrors occasioned by the Bubonic Plague, plus
regular outbreaks of rebellion against rapacious local magnates, Western Europeans instinctively
turned toward the Church for succor and guidance. But the Church—the sole previously
recognized body greater than the local universe everyone inhabited—was passing through its
own specific tribulations. With the Avignon Papacy (1309-1378) followed immediately by the
chaos of the Great Schism (1348-1415), and succeeded in short order by the Renaissance Papacy
(more consumed with beautifying Rome than with spiritual care), the Church managed to
convince all but the hardiest of believers that it hardly deserved temporal confidence, even if it
remained the only broker of eternal hope. 4
But during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, as confidence in the ministrations of the
Church was waning, the nation-states of Western Europe were becoming better integrated around
significant royal leaders. Whatever their particular title—king, grand duke, or prince—these
major leaders, surrounded by influential advisers from noble families and other grandees, began

4

For a discussion of this, see my Getting the Reformation Wrong: Correcting Some Misunderstandings (Downers
Grove, Illinois: IVP Academic, 2010), 23-51.
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to make significant impact on the lives of the inhabitants of the regions they ruled. With all this,5
loyalties began shifting to those magnates because of the perceived benefits of living under their
rule, which included safety against invaders and some semblance of law and order. Thus the
beginnings of a sense of “nation” dawned in Western Europe; people were aware to some degree
of a benefit shared with others beyond their immediate circle of acquaintances, a benefit
associated collectively with this ruler (and his successors). For the members of that royal court
and the broader company of nobles more intimately associated with that ruler, the sense of
“nation” was even stronger. But in all this, the budding sense of “nation” revolved around the
ruler; it had little to do with a sense of anything shared among those he ruled, except the benefits
of that rule. This pattern obtained through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and most of
the eighteenth.
But with the coming of the French Revolution in 1789, a rebellion against a distant king
from whom little benefit seemed any longer to come to the inhabitants of the “nation” he ruled, a
revolution culminating in the execution of that king, an extraordinary anomaly arose: in the name
of the people misruled—the “nation” of France—the rebels had eliminated the focus of the only
previous sense of “nation” they (or anyone else) had developed. To meet this desideratum,
intellectuals among the rebels articulated another sense of “nation”—this time, not focused on
the ruler but on the people. 6 According to the revised definition, “nation” focused on a “people”
who were a “nation” because of what they shared—namely, history, language, and culture. This
common background bound these people together and constituted them a “nation.” 7 This new
5

See the insightful treatment by Bernard Guenée, States and Rulers in Later Medieval Europe (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1988).
6
Jean Jacques Rousseau played a leading role in initiating this development, even though his particular approach did
not become the accepted viewpoint
7
Carlton J.H. Hayes, with Hans Kohn often considered the founding fathers of academic scholarship on nationalism,
embraces this view, articulated in the wake of the French Revolution, as the best understanding of what a nation is:
see his discussion in “What is Nationalism?”, 1-29 in his Essays on Nationalism (New York: Russell & Russell,
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view of “nation” both justified the rebellion which had taken place and set a new path into the
future for that nation—the French people who shared a common history, language, and culture.
As this notion took root, it became an ideology, “nationalism.” But before that could be nurtured,
the notion itself needed to be inculcated among the French “nation” which had not hitherto
understood itself in this fashion: that is, they needed to see and understand themselves, as the
French nation, in terms of that shared history, language, and culture.
As a startled Europe looked on and listened in, people in other regions discerned a
message of hope for themselves and others with whom they shared history, language, and
culture, but endured disunity or repressive imperial rule. These notions took time to win
allegiance; by the time they caught on widely outside of France, the nineteenth century was
underway—and so this view has sometimes been called “nineteenth-century nationalism.” As
against the Enlightenment with its elitist appeal to intellectuals via reason, this sense of nation
appealed to what the common people as a whole shared, so it has also been styled “Romantic”
nationalism. By whatever name this viewpoint goes, though, this view of “nation” and its
ideological spawn, nationalism—focused on the people and what they share—has
unquestionably had significant influence, not only in Western Europe, but in far-flung regions of
the world.
The scholarly perspective on this sense of nation and nationalism in western scholarship
has confidently claimed that this phenomenon first found expression in Western Europe
(specifically, France) in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Western scholars recognize
that nationalistic longings have burst forth around the world, but the assumption is that the sense
of nation requisite to all such longings—namely, a shared history, language, and culture—first

1966), especially 6-7, 21.
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found expression in Western Europe. 8
Problems with this Assessment
In reflecting on this common scholarly viewpoint, three points deserve to be noted.
Firstly in 1991 when Benedict Anderson's revised edition of his book was published, he lamented “an unselfconscious provincialism” among scholars in the field, “accustomed to the conceit that everything important in the modern world originated in Europe.” 9 His assessment would
have been more accurate if he had added the adjective, “Western,” before “Europe”—for reasons
to be laid out below.
Secondly, it is important to recognize that, while Anderson gave some treatment to religion vis-à-vis the emergence of nationalism, he did so as a predecessor movement which embraced much larger entities than a “nation” could be (specifically referring to the “umma” of Islam and to Christendom). 10 This overlooks the role religion has regularly played in shaping cultures, including the “cultures” which various respective “nations” could share (along with history
and language). It makes historical sense that he did so, for the French Revolution was marked by
a strong animus against the shared religious background the French people had known in Roman
Catholicism. However, positing such distance from religion was neither necessary for the development of “nation” and “nationalism” nor accurate in describing its earlier emergence, as will be
seen below.

8

For examples of this, see the comments by one of the recognized leaders in the study of nationalism, Hans Kohn,
in The Age of Nationalism: The First Era of Global History (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 3-5; also, his The
Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background (Toronto: Collier Books, 1969), 10-11, 14-15; as well,
his Nationalism: Its Meaning and History, rev. ed. (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1965), 9; for a
brief rendition of the historical course of “The Received Sense of Nationalism” among scholars, see K.R. Minogue,
Nationalism (London: B.T. Batsford, 1967), 19-21; Minogue also specifically points out that the leading scholars in
the field view nationalism as first arising in the wake of the French Revolution (17).
9
Anderson, Imagined Communities, xiii.
10

Anderson, Imagined Communities, 12-19.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE, VOL. XXXV, NO. 3 (JULY 2015)

6

This assessment is corroborated, thirdly, by what some other scholars in the field have
recently published about the role played by religion in the emergence of nation and nationalism.
Several such studies have appeared, arguing for the significant influence religion exercised in
shaping notions of nation and nationalism. Significantly, many of these still focus on developments in Western Europe, 11 thus falling again under Anderson's critique about (Western) European provincialism. In so doing, they fail to recognize a much earlier development of a sense of
nation and nationalism, definitely rooted—in surprising ways—in religion.

BALKAN NATIONS
In southeastern Europe, religion played a dominant role in shaping notions of “nation”
and “nationalism.” In the Balkans, two religions—Islam and Orthodox Christianity—interacted
in ways that ensured the development of a sense of nation and of nationalism much earlier than
western scholarship has recognized.
Ottoman Millet
In 1454, the year after conquering Constantinople, Sultan Mehmet II made a momentous
decision regarding the organization of his burgeoning empire. By this time, the Ottomans ruled
over all of Asia Minor and almost all of the Balkans; what little remained of the latter soon fell
under his onslaughts. In many regards, the Ottoman Empire and its rulers manifested less
deliberation about their domains and what they hoped to achieve as leaders of the Muslim world
than their predecessors in Damascus under the Umayyads, or in Baghdad under the Abbasids, or
in Andalusian Spain under another branch of the Umayyads. But in the decision Mehmet made in
1454, he showed remarkable insight into his own realm and into the diverse peoples over whom

11

See the careful review offered in Rogers Brubaker, “Religion and Nationalism: Four Approaches,” Nations and
Nationalism 18 (2012):2-20, and the literature there adduced.
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he and his minority of fellow Muslims now ruled in Southeastern Europe. The peoples he had
conquered in the Balkans had been Christian—either Western Catholic or Eastern Orthodox—for
centuries. To meet this challenge effectively, Mehmet established the “millet” system. To
understand its significance, both for his realm and then for the question of the genesis of a sense
of “nation” and “nationalism” among Balkan peoples, we need to consider some background
information.
1. The Muslim Worldview
According to Islam, Muslims are members of one large community, the “umma,” which
includes all Muslims in the world. The umma is to be the ultimate focus of loyalty and allegiance
while Muslims live on earth. Given that, for a Muslim to embrace what we know as
“nationalism” would long have been viewed as reneging on allegiance to the umma. It was not
until the late nineteenth century that Muslim teaching began to accommodate the idea that
Muslims could legitimately identify themselves in a nationalistic sense with a nation; even then,
though, ultimate loyalty belonged to the umma. So, while our investigations into the provenience
of nation and nationalism in the Balkans take us to an enactment by a sultan of the Ottoman
Empire, we will not find that genesis in this portion of the Muslim worldview.
Islam had no expectation that all those whom its armies conquered would become
Muslims. It was sufficient that theocratic rule be instituted to the honor of Allah. In that regard,
special privilege was accorded to the “peoples of the book”—that is, Jews and Christians—who,
according to Islamic teaching, had received Allah’s prior stages of revelation in (respectively)
the Jewish Scriptures and the Gospels. These “protected people” were called “dhimmi.”
Protection came at a price, though: dhimmi had to pay a special tax and faced some specific
limitations in what they could do. This had been the pattern adopted in the initial spread of
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Muslim power out of the Arabian peninsula throughout the whole of what had previously been
the Persian Empire, Egypt and the Maghreb in North Africa, Spain, and (eventually) all of the
Byzantine Empire.
2. The New Situation for Ottoman Rule
But with the final conquest of the lynchpin of the Byzantine Empire, Constantinople, in
1453, a different situation confronted the Turkish sultan than any preceding Muslim ruler had
faced. In previous centuries, Muslims had conquered territories which had not known religious
unity: the Persian Empire followed, by and large, Zoroastrianism—which was not a religion of
the book and so was roughly treated; the “Nestorian” and “Monophysite” Christians in Persia, as
well as in Syria and Palestine, were not the dominant religions in the realm; and in Andalusian
Spain, previous tensions and distances between Visigothic conquerors committed to Arianism
and the Catholic Christians they ruled had precluded shared religious loyalty. 12
But the situation was drastically different in Southeastern Europe. There, the various
peoples had embraced either Western Catholic Christianity or Eastern Orthodox Christianity
some five centuries previously. Their respective commitments had been fired in the conflicts that
broke out among the various kingdoms that arose in the Balkans, which ended up with Catholic
Croats ruling Orthodox Serbs, then Bulgarian Orthodox conquering Orthodox Serbs and
threatening Orthodox Byzantium, Orthodox Serbs later conquering Greek Orthodox and
Bulgarian Orthodox alike and also threatening Orthodox Byzantium, and Bosnians affiliated with
a schismatic Bosnian church still later attacking Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats. In all this,

12

To be sure, the Visigothic king Reccared (r. 586-601) came to see that if he and his people were to have any hope
of consolidating the peninsula into a unity, it would have to be on the basis of Catholic Christianity, which he
officially embraced at the Third Council of Toledo in 589. Since the Visigoths had ruthlessly repressed their
Catholic subjects since the conquest of the peninsula (c. 410), though, those subjects were leery of too readily
trusting their overlords. Civil and religious unity had not been achieved by 711, when Muslim forces burst into the
Spanish peninsula.
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state commitments embraced Christianity in its western or its eastern form, and kingdoms
struggled with nearby kingdoms which often held the same version of the faith. Significantly,
following the organizational patterns of Orthodox Christianity, both the Bulgarian and the
Serbian churches became “autocephalous,” governing themselves as the churches of their
respective people groups.
What Mehmet II faced was a very different situation among his subject peoples than any
previous Muslim leader had known. His decision to organize Ottoman oversight of the dhimmi in
his realm in a more official way than any Muslim ruler ever had, by establishing millets for his
non-Muslim subjects, ended up assuring that the various major subject peoples would develop a
sense of nation and nationalism 13 centuries earlier than in Western Europe.
3. The Millet System
In contemporary Turkish, “millet” means “nation,” with all the notions associated with
the term in today's political parlance. However, in the fifteenth century, “millet” carried no
associations with borders, government, or any of the normal accoutrements with which a nation
would be decked out in the present. “Millet” then found its connotation within the Islamic
worldview. Muslims recognized that the “peoples of the book” were “other” than Muslims but
still constituted a community as those who earlier in history had been called into being by divine
revelation. Mehmet used the term “millet” to describe the large religious groupings among the
dhimmi in his realm. The Orthodox millet was by far the largest; most Christians in the Balkans
had embraced Orthodoxy, whether as Byzantines, Bulgarians, Serbs, or the people later known
as Romanians. A second millet included the considerable numbers of Armenians within the
Ottoman realm, along with the Catholics (mostly found among Croats, some Albanians, and the
13

I have dealt with other ramifications of the millet system in my “Ottoman Millet, Religious Nationalism, and Civil
Society: Focus on Kosovo,” Religion in Eastern Europe 26/1 (2006):11-23.
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Hungarians who had been swallowed up by Ottoman conquests). A third millet was comprised of
the Jews in the realm, both Sephardic and Ashkenazic. In territorial terms, these millets
overlapped each other: they were bounded not by borders but by religious commitment. The only
significant consideration was which of the millets a person belonged to; this offered a refinement
of preceding Muslim practices with dhimmi, distinguishing among them in an official and
organizational sense.
In each millet, the chief religious leader—for the Orthodox, the patriarch of
Constantinople; for the Armenian/Catholic one, the Armenian Catholicos; for the Jews, the chief
rabbi—was responsible for the good behavior of the millet he oversaw. While the members of
the millet were entitled to govern themselves by their respective religious traditions, common
practices, and laws (as long as these did not intrude on Muslim law), they were still subject to
Ottoman control. The millet system assured that the chief religious leader of each millet
remained responsible directly to the sultan—who, if displeased, might well replace that leader or
order his execution.
Orthodox Nations and Nationalism
While the respective situations of all three millets each is intriguing in its own right, for
our investigation, we focus especially on the Orthodox millet. It comprised the vast majority of
the Christian subjects in Ottoman territory. It was among the Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman
Empire that, under the impress and influence of the millet system, a sense of nation and
nationalism developed—and did so long before the events of 1789 in France.
The imposition of the millet system was resented by the subject peoples of the Ottoman
Empire, as part of the unwelcome burden of foreign rule. But the prior histories of those peoples
had prepared them to survive within that system and—with a view to what would become a
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sense of nation and nationalism—even to flourish because of it. A brief rehearsal of the prior
history will help us get our bearings in this regard.
The Byzantine Empire, Bulgaria, and Serbia had embraced Orthodox Christianity and
had witnessed the conflicts between it and Western Christianity (as manifested in the tensions
around the crusades, and especially the horrors of the Fourth Crusade of 1204). While it cannot
readily be claimed that the common people or even the leaders understood the differences
between the two Christian confessions in any particular depth, the way they reacted to Western
Christianity necessitates the recognition that each of these people groups was firmly committed
to its Orthodox confession when they were brought under Ottoman rule. With the small
percentages in each group that availed themselves of the advantages afforded anyone who
converted to Islam, it is clear that they remained committed to that Christian confession.
Beyond that, each of these nations had experienced tensions and warfare with its
Orthodox neighbors, as noted above. Through these conflicts, each people group had become
aware of nearby “others” who embraced the same pattern of faith and practice while still being
opponents. It should also be remembered that their respective avowals of Orthodoxy were of
long standing.
What all this means is that the respective people groups’ commitment to their Orthodox
confession had been deepened by the passage of time and fired by conflict with others. When the
Muslims took over and reduced all these Christian peoples to dhimmi status, Greeks (as previous
Byzantines came to be known), Bulgars, and Serbs all profoundly resented both their loss of
independence and being ruled by a non-Christian power. But while the Bulgarians and the Serbs
were Orthodox, they also resented their submission under the patriarch of Constantinople for two
reasons. In the first place, both people groups had their own autocephalous churches before the
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Ottoman occupation, both saw their group as distinct from the Byzantine Greeks, and both
wanted their self-governing churches back. Secondly, as the generations passed, the (Greek)
patriarch in Constantinople increasingly seemed to Bulgarians and Serbs 14 too much the servant
of the Ottoman sultan—and too Greek! Careful placement of his Greek confreres as the hierarchs
throughout the Orthodox millet perhaps had assured him of better subordinates, but their loyal
administrations insured resentment on the part of the Bulgarian and Serbian Orthodox faithful,
who saw the Greek leaders as manipulating their privileges for Greek dominance. With that, the
submission of Bulgarians and Serbs became ever more hesitant and suspicious. This all led them
eventually to repudiate the leadership of the patriarch of Constantinople. By the sultan's decision,
the autocephalous status of the Serbian Orthodox Church was restored in 1557, only to be taken
away again in 1766, with autocephaly returning in 1848. The Bulgarian Orthodox Church only
received its autocephalous status again, also by the sultan's permission, in 1870.
What this all shows, in summary fashion, is that these members of the Orthodox millet in
the Ottoman Empire could and did remain staunch in both their religious commitment and in
their determination to remain Bulgarian or Serb. The millet system served as midwife to the birth
of a sense of nation and nationalism for the Balkan peoples.
This assessment is confirmed by the striking way these subject peoples viewed those of
their number who converted to Islam. When this transpired—as it did in small percentages
among both Bulgarians and Serbs—those who converted were not considered Bulgarian or
Serbian Muslims—rather, they were considered “Turks.” Not only were they no longer in the
Orthodox millet—these converts were no longer either Bulgarian or Serb. They had not, of
14

In due course, as the peoples of Romania coalesced into a nation, they came to similar assessments of the
Orthodox patriarch and the Byzantine Greeks as the Serbs and Bulgars; however, since the Romanians had not come
to their national self-awareness until well into the lengthy period they spent in the Ottoman Empire, this study does
not focus on them. Even so, the perspectives of the Serbs and Bulgarians described below came to mark Romanian
viewpoints.
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course, changed their genetic inheritance, but for the subject peoples of the Balkans, to change
religious commitment was to “become” a member of another “nation.”
In the Ottoman Empire, in the wake of the 1454 establishment of the millet system, a
people group was identified by its particular religious commitment. Down through succeeding
centuries, the way these peoples thought of themselves collectively had their group—i.e., their
“nation”—and church all wrapped up together. In terms of what would later be espoused in the
aftermath of the French Revolution as the “key” to identifying a “nation,” the Bulgarian and
Serbian people groups within the Orthodox millet each indeed shared its own distinctive history,
culture, and language. But more important for the development of the sense of nation and of
nationalism among them, the preeminent element each shared as a nation in the long-standing
Ottoman Empire was its religious commitment. These “nations” focused on their religion as what
united them—for each nation, their shared history and culture flowed from their shared religious
commitment. This was also true even of their languages; they were only allowed to teach and
learn Bulgarian or Serbian in the schools established in the waning days of the Ottoman Empire
by the sultan’s permission, given to prepare them to engage in the religious services of their
respective national churches.
The foundational nature of this religious commitment even served to trump what
otherwise might be held in common with neighbors. Even if other people groups had shared a
fair amount of the history, culture, and language, Croats (committed to Western Catholic
Christianity), Serbs (committed to Orthodoxy), and Bosnians (many or most of whom had
converted to Islam), because of their divergent religious commitments, did not constitute a
“nation.” They were “others,” different nations because they had different religious
commitments.
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So, when the subject peoples of the Ottoman Empire were exposed to the Romantic
nationalism spawned in Western Europe, the Bulgars and Serbs were already focused
preeminently on their religion as what bound each of them together in a strong sense of nation
and nationalism. Their respective national commitments to Orthodox Christianity helped
Bulgarians and Serbs “find” and identify themselves ever more clearly—with all the hopes and
aspirations for national liberation from the rule of their Muslim overlords in the Ottoman
Empire. In 1830, the Serbs achieved self-government within the Ottoman empire, with full
independence following in 1868. Bulgaria followed a similar pattern, respectively, in 1878 and
1908.

Conclusion
The development of a sense of nation and nationalism among the Balkan peoples in the
Ottoman Empire challenges the common way western scholars have thought and written about
the genesis of nation and nationalism. That assessment assumes and builds on the experience of
peoples in Western Europe and fits what transpired there. According to this perspective, in
earlier centuries, only the upper classes had a sense of nation. While the common people might
have a general awareness of certain tangible benefits from living under the governance of a
particular ruler or dynasty, their notion of “nation” was quite limited. It only really awakened in
the aftermath of the French Revolution, when these people came to understand that they shared a
common history, culture, and language with many others, and that together they constituted a
nation. This “sense” of nation, of this “imagined community,” thus took root not earlier than the
late eighteenth century, but for most sometime during the nineteenth.
But what had transpired in the Balkans indicates that this scholarly reading is in error: for
the subject peoples of the Ottoman Empire, the millet system made them inescapably aware of
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belonging to a particular national community long before the French Revolution. With their
previous history as nations and as autocephalous churches, with the millet system established as
of 1454 and the way it shaped how people viewed themselves and their neighbors, historical data
indicate that the Bulgarians and the Serbs viewed themselves as nations long before their
Western European counterparts came to that collective self-awareness. 15
In this regard (as in many others) western scholars have conducted their investigations
and come to their conclusions without considering the history of Eastern Europe. It seems clear,
from what we know of their prior histories, that the Balkan peoples who would be subsumed
within the Ottoman Empire already had a significant sense of themselves as distinct from their
neighbors before the Turks burst into Southeastern Europe. But even if that could be restricted to
an awareness only among the upper classes in the period before the Ottomans took control, what
we find among those subject peoples—when they no longer had any upper classes, in the wake
of the Ottoman conquest—is a national self-awareness rooted in their religious commitment from
deep within the fifteenth century already.
The common western scholarly assessment of how, when, and where the sense of nation
and nationalism first saw the historical light of day is badly mistaken. What has been confidently
presented by most western scholars in history or political science who have dealt with this
question has missed the mark by at least 335 years and more than 2250 kilometers.
And it is perhaps worth noting that, in a significant way, such national self-awareness is a
shared legacy of the Orthodox faith and the Muslim presence in Europe, since the millet system
adopted for the Ottoman Empire paved the way for the Balkan sense of nation and nationalism,
rooted in religious commitment.
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